ABSTRACT:The aim of this paper is to revisit what has often been described as a watershed moment in recent feminist activism and scholarship, namely the embrace of gender-specific concerns by international human rights law and the recognition of women’s rights as human rights, which gained heightened visibility starting in the early 1990s. Gender-based violence committed in armed conflict, in particular, animated international feminist scholarship in unprecedented ways, primarily, because it was considered an obvious feminist issue, but also because feminist advocates sensed an opportunity to visibilise wartime sexual violence against women by way of international law aiming to provide legitimacy to a long marginalised phenomenon of war. In line with this development, feminist inclusion strategies, such gender mainstreaming1 that actively promote women’s visibility across the United Nations human rights machinery have assumed a central role in transforming the former absence of women from international law into part of its institutional machinery. And yet there is a sense that the triumph of gender came at a cost to women. Current feminist debates around the issue, for example, reveal a profound tension between ‘universalist feminists’, who generally endorse the jurisprudence of the tribunals and fear that any destabilisation of the female subject or critique of the law will lead to a rupturing of the perceived successes achieved and feminists advocating for critical introspection, who have mainly been sidelined from the dominant debate for fear that their concerns would lead to a renewed denial of female authenticity.2
This article aims to contribute perspective to what the visibility of gender within the international human rights machinery signifies for women in the current political and legal moment. More centrally, it questions whether the embrace of gender terminology is linked to a determination to provide legitimacy to a previously invisible subject in law, the woman. It asks whether feminism with its unequivocal lobbying for the inclusion of politically neutral terminology might have inadvertently departed from its original politics of women.
*Daniela Nadj, LLB, LLM, PhD is a graduate of Queen Mary College, Cornell University and the University of Westminster. Currently a lecturer in law at the University of Westminster, she has lectured in the following subjects: The United Nations System for the Protection of Human Rights; Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom; International Criminal Law; Public Law, EU Law, Evidence Tort and Contract Law. During the academic year 2011-2012, she acted as senior lecturer in law/LLB programme coordinator at Middlesex University, Mauritius. Daniela’s primary research interests lie in the fields of international criminal law, human rights, feminist legal theory and armed conflict. Her research focuses on international wartime sexual violence jurisprudence and its impact on women in the current political and legal moment.
1 Gender mainstreaming has been defined by the UN Economic and Social Council as follows: ‘Mainstreaming of gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic, societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.’ United Nations (1997) ‘Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997’, A/52/3, 18 September, 1997.
2 See for example: K. Engle, 'Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina', 99 American Journal of International Law (2005), 778 at 779.
3 H. Charlesworth, ‘Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United Nations’, 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2005), 1.
4 Gender mainstreaming strategies have increasingly been deployed in UN Security Council Resolutions as a means of visibilising gender-based violence against women during armed conflict, while at the same time seeking to increase female participation in peace processes and truth and reconciliation mechanisms.For a discussion see: C. Bell & C. O’Rourke, ‘Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements’, 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (October 2010), 941
5 J. Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’,91 American Historical Review (1986), 1053.
6 Jane Flax has, for example, has argued that the term ‘gender relations’ captures gender as a complex set of social processes. Gender as an analytical category and social process is thus seen as relational, while gender relations are complex and unstable processes…constituted by and though interrelated parts.’ J. Flax, ‘Postmodernism and Gender Relations’, in L. Nicholson, (ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism, (New York, NY:Routledge, 1990), 44.
7 Scott (1986), 1056.
8 Ibid at1056-1057.
9 Ibid at 1056.
10 The term gender was, for example, only included in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action after states agreed that it was to be interpreted according to its ‘ordinary, generally accepted usage’, and that no new connotation differing from its original usage would be deployed in the Beijing Platform for Action. For a discussion, see: B. Bedont & K. Hall Martinez, ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the International Criminal Court’, VI The Brown Journal of World Affairs (1999) 66,67;V. Oosterveldt(2005), 55, 56.
11 W. Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in an Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 15.
12 As Elena Loizidou states, ‘Sex and gender are always at the centre of feminist debates’. In E. Loizidou, ‘The Trouble with Rape: Gender Matters and Legal ‘Transformations’’, 7 Feminist Legal Studies (1999), 279.
13 In S. Engle Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 25.
14 C. Chinkin, ‘A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’, 10 European Journal of International Law (1999), 387.
15 The disproportionately negative impact of the private/public binary in international law has also been theorised by Donna Sullivan in the United States context. She has thus argued that state intervention into private life only seems to have occurred only in relation to disempowered communities, such as black women upon whom the state had sought to impose coercive reproductive health policies in the past. Thus, race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation have all shaped definitions of what constitutes a family life entitled to protection against state intervention. In D. Sullivan, ‘Women’s Human Rights and the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights', 88 American Journal of International Law, (Jan. 1994), 126 at 127.
16 R. Copelon,Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture, in R. Cook Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 116.
17 See for example R. Coomaraswamy and L. Kois, ‘Women and International Human Rights Law’, in K. Askin and D. Koenig (eds.) Women and International Human Rights Law, (New York, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1999), 180.
18 One of the central preoccupations of feminist legal scholarship, as Hillary Charlesworth points out, has been the structure of international law itself, which has been built on the silence of women. This sense of inferiority has been reinforced in international law through the exclusive focus on the public sphere at the expense of the private sphere, the latter having traditionally served as the site of oppression for women. Charlesworth, thus, contrasts the male sphere of the workplace, law, economics, politics, intellectual and cultural life with the ‘home, heart and family' preserve of female identity arguing that the public/private distinction operates to obscure and justify men's domination over women. In H. Charlesworth et al., ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’,93 American Journal of International Law, (1991), 616. The public/private distinction in international law has extensively been critiqued elsewhere, and in the early and mid 1990’s dominated international feminist scholarship. See: H. Charlesworth, ‘Human Rights as Men’s Rights’, in Peters, Wolper (eds.), Women’s Rights: Human Rights, (London: Routledge, 1995), 103-114; K. Engle, ‘After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights’, in D. Dallmeyer (ed.) Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law, 143-157; F. Olsen, ‘International Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinctions’, in Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law, 157-171; C. Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/ Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in R. Cook (ed.) Human Rights of Women, University of Pennsylvania Press, (1994), 85-116.
19 See Coomaraswamy (1999) at 180.
20 C. Bunch ‘Women’s Human Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights’, 12 Human Rights Quarterly, (1990); for a critique see D. Otto, ‘Holding Up Half the Sky but for Whose Benefit? A Critical Analysis of the Fourth World Conference on Women', 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal (1996), 7.
21 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No.19, U.N. Doc A/47/38 (Eleventh session, 1992). [Hereinafter General Recommendation No.19], at para.1.
22 CEDAW is one of six UN Conventions that have been widely ratified and are monitored regularly by the CEDAW Committee. As on one of six conventions forming the core of the human rights system, it has been firmly dedicated to the principle of universalism, or the idea of ‘minimal’ standards of human dignity that must be protected in all societies. See: Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Violence against Women (CEDAW), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 ILM 33 (1980), adopted by GA. Res. 180 (XXXIV) (18 Dec. 1979), entered into force: 3. Sept. 1981
23 For a critique see: S Zearfoss, ‘The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Radical, Reasonable or Reactionary?’ 12 Michigan Journal of International Law, (1997), 912.
24 K. Askin, & D. Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law (New York, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1999), 42.
25 R. Coomaraswamy & L. Kois, <.i>Women and International Human Rights Law, in K. Askin & D. Koenig, Women and International Human Rights Law, (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999), 178.
26 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 established gender mainstreaming as ‘the global strategy for promoting gender equality’. See Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview (DAW/OSAGI, New York, 2001) and Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Gender Equality (New York, OSAGI, 2001). At the United Nations, gender mainstreaming was created through the adoption of the Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) Agreed Conclusions, on gender mainstreaming in 1997 and through the Secretary-General’s communication to management the same year. The ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions gave the UN-women centred institutions-the intergovernmental Commission on the Status of Women and the Secretariat institutions, the Division for the Advancement of Women and the Office of the Special Advisor on Women’s Advancement and Gender Issues-the mandate to develop, initiate and promote UN gender mainstreaming. The ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions also stressed that gender mainstreaming is a system-wide and broad based strategy. In short, equality between the sexes should no longer be addressed as a separate women’s issue, but the promotion of equality should be part of all UN activities. See ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1992.
27 See for example: C. Bunch, ‘Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective’, in J. Peters and A. Wolper (eds.), Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 11 (this article discusses widespread violence against women);R. Cook, ‘International Human Rights and Women’s Reproductive Health’, in Peters and Wolper (eds.), (1995), 256 (This article discusses the causes and effects of female genital mutilation); I. Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries’, 23 Columbia HumanRights Law Review (1991-92), 189; R. Copelon, ‘Recognising the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 Columbia Human Rights Law Review, (1994), 291, D. Otto, ‘Violence Against Women: Something Other than a Human Rights Violation?’, 1 Australian Feminist Law Journal (1993), 159,. For an excellent critique of the VAW discourse: see: R. Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native Subject” in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics', 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal, (2002), 1. Also see: V. Nesiah, ‘Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of US Feminist Legal Scholarship’, 16(1) Harvard Women’s Law Journal (1995), 32
28 In R. Kapur, 'The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native Subject” in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics', 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal, (2002), 1.
29 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19, U.N. Doc A/47/38 (Eleventh session, 1992).[Hereinafter General Recommendation, No.19].
30 Merry Engle (2006), at 23.
31 General Recommendation No.19, Preamble. According to Engle Merry, this statement ‘[p]laced violence against women squarely within the rubric of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and it made clear that states would be obliged to eliminate violence perpetrated by public officials or authorities , as well as private actors. See: Engle Merry (2006), at 21. On Otto’s view, moreover, the CEDAW framework has by way of these General Recommendations strengthened the substantive equality framework that advance then project of ‘re-imagination’ of women’s rights by further releasing CEDAW’s subject from comparison with men.See: Otto (2006) at 340.
32 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, part.II, para. 38.
33 General Recommendation 19 defines gender-based violence as a form of discrimination that ‘seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.’ Gender-based violence is violence directed against a woman ‘because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and any other deprivations of liberty.’ General Recommendation, No.19, at para. 1.
34 General Recommendation No.19, Preamble. According to Engle Merry, this statement ‘[p]laced violence against women squarely within the rubric of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and it made clear that states would be obliged to eliminate violence perpetrated by public officials or authorities , as well as private actors. See: Engle Merry (2006), at 21. On Otto’s view, moreover, the CEDAW framework has by way of these General Recommendations strengthened the substantive equality framework that advance then project of ‘re-imagination’ of women’s rights by further releasing CEDAW’s subject from comparison with men.A further example Otto provides is of General Recommendation 16, which urges State parties to recognise and value women’s unpaid contributions and makes it clear that the Committee considers unpaid wok in family enterprises to be a form of exploitation of women contrary to CEDAW. See: Otto (2006) at 340.
35 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS (9 June, 1994), Doc. OEA/ Ser.P AG/doc. 3115/94 rev. 2 (commonly referred to either as the Convention of Belém do Para, or the Inter-American Convention against Violence).
36 As she has put it, ‘The recognition that violence against women is a social creation allows the freedom to challenge its use and suggest alternative plans and programs for its elimination. It grants opportunities to create a new history in which violence against women would be condemned and not recognized as an inevitable and unchangeable consequence of gender relations.’ See Coomaraswamy (1999) at 177.
37 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, part.II, para. 38.
38 The Special Rapporteur forms part of the special procedures under the newly established Human Rights Council. For a recent overview of the work of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences,see: ’15 Years of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (1994-2009)-A Critical Review', Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/rapporteur/docs/15YearReviewofVAWMandate.pdf; (last accessed in April, 2011). For a discussion of the key roles inherent in the post, see: H. Charlesworth & C.Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 149-150.
39 The concluding document formally recognises the human rights of women as ‘an inalienable integral and indivisible part of human rights.’ General Assembly A/CONF. 157/23 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (12 July, 1993), at para. 18. Available at: www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument (last accessed in May, 2011).
40 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) (15.Sept, 1995).
41 The Preparatory Commission and Assembly of State Parties [hereinafter PrepComI] conducted the drafting and promulgation of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the ICC Elements of Crime. For an extensive critical feminist overview of this process, see: Halley (2008-2009), at 18.
42 The treaty to establish the ICC was adopted in Rome on July 17, 1998 with the affirmative vote of 120 countries at the ‘Rome Conference’. See: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), entered into force on July 1, 2002. [hereinafter the Rome Statute].
43 This was an alliance of feminist legal activists and scholars mostly composed of Canadian and U.S. representatives. They were part of a larger, yet loosely knit global campaign for women’s human rights, which identified the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights as a target for grassroots organising on behalf of women’s human rights. Counting about 200 affiliates at the time the Conference began, its overarching aim was to transform existing human rights discoursesthrough the integration of women’s rights. It thus adopted a consolidated and coherent platform for reform and lobbied hard in the Rome Statute negotiations. Fora discussion see: Bedont&Hall-Martinez (1999), 66. As Janet Halley has argued, although a large number of NGOs were involved in the Prep ComI, the WCGJ, as the only nominally women’s or feminist organisations successfully became their coalition leader. As Halley points out, this alone is evidence that it mastered the ‘behavioral codes’ that gave some NGOs legitimacy. For a critical discussion of its activities, see Halley (2008-2009), at 22, 23.
44 Bedont & Hall-Martinez (1999), 66.
45 An overview of the composition, mandate and structure of the court is available at: www.icty.org.
46 An overview of the Rwanda Tribunal is available at: www.ictr.org.
47 These delegations included the Vatican and a core group of Islamic states, who were hostile to the idea of adopting the concept of gender when addressing gender crimes.Ibid at, 67. See also: V. Oosterveldt, ‘Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing International Law’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law, (2003), 605.
48 Oosterveldt (2005), 55, 56.
49 But some Arab states, for example, objected to the term ‘gender’ claiming that it may be understood to include sexual orientation. Such positions also served to justify obstructions on many provisions throughout the statute which promoted women’s rights. The dispute regarding terminology, thus, threatened the inclusion of certain gender crimes, of a non-discriminations clause, and of special protective measures under the procedural provisions.In Bedont & Hall- Martinez (1999), 67.
50 Art. 7(3) Rome Statute.
51 For a discussion, see: Bedont & Hall Martinez,(1999), 66;Oosterveldt(2005), 55, 56.
51 Art. 7(3) Rome Statute.
52 Bedont & Hall-Martinez (1999), 65-85. For a discussion on the conceptual differences between ‘gender’ and ‘sex crimes’, moreover, see: I. Skjelsbaek, ‘Sexual Violence and War: Mapping out a Complex Relationship’, 7 European Journal of International Relations (2001), 212.
53 Oosterveldt, (2005), 71.
54 Charlesworth and Chinkin, for example, argue that the phrase presents gender as an issue of biology rather than social construction, and that the definition therefore has limited transformative edge. They fault the definition’s lack of attention to aspects of social relations that are culturally contingent and without a foundation in biological necessity, as use of the term ‘gender’ should do. In H. Charlesworth; C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 335.
55 For an in-depth discussion of the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, see: C. Moser & A. Moser, ‘Gender Mainstreaming since Beijing: A review of Success and Limitations in International Institutions’ 13 (2) Gender and Development, (July, 2005), 11.
56 United Nations (1997) ‘Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997’, A/52/3, 18 September, 1997.
57 Moser & Moser (2005), at 11.
58 In H. Charlesworth, ‘Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United Nations’, 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2005), 1 at 3.
59 See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,1 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing 4-15 September, 1995, U.N. Doc A/CONF.177/REV.1, UN Sales No. 96 IV.13 (1996), at para. 79.
60 At para. 105.
61 Ibid at para, 123
62 Ibid at para. 141.
63 Ibid at para. 164.
64 Ibid at para. 189.
65 Ibid at para. 229.
66 This wording appears throughout the Beijing paragraphs.
67 V. Oosterveldt, (2005), at 82.
68 Foreign & Commonwealth Office (U.K.), Inclusive Government: Mainstreaming Gender into Foreign Policy (2004), cited in Charlesworth (2005), at 3.
69 Provisional Summary Record of the 20th Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, 1997 Substantive Sess., U.N. Doc.A/52/3/Rev. 1 (1997).
70 Report of the Economic and Social Council for the Year 1997, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No.3, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/52/3 Rev.1 (1997).
71 The gender policy of the World Health Organisation (WHO), for instance states that the ‘WHO, will as a matter of policy and good public health practice, integrate gender considerations in all facets of its work.’ See: WHO Gender Policy: Integrating Gender Perspectives in the Work of WHO 1 (2002). Cited in Charlesworth (2005) at 5.
72 This has been similarly reiterated across various U.N. mission statements, such as the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Bank, and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Moreover, gender mainstreaming is also firmly entrenched inside the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Commonwealth. Ibid at 6.
73 The Human Rights Committee is the body responsible for monitoring the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). For an overview of the work of the Committee, see the website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Availlable at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm. (last accessed in July, 2011).
74 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 28’ (29 March 2000), UN Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.10.Cited in Otto (2006), at 348.
75 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 28, reprinted in Otto (2005), at 349.
76 Moreover, a husband’s marital powers to restrict women’s freedom of movement (Article 12) constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of movement, and making the exercise of reproductive rights contingent upon a husband’s authorisation is seen as a violation of the right to privacy (Article 17). The Human Rights Committee has consistently followed up the adoption of General Comment 28 by questioning state parties about issues such as unsafe abortions, domestic violence, stereotyped gender attitudes and gender discrimination in the enjoyment of rights during its examination of States Parties’ reports. In Otto (2005) at 349.
77 Ibid at 350.
79 S. Kouvo, ‘The United Nations and Gender Mainstreaming: Limits and Possibilities’, in D. Buss and A. Manji, International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches: (Oxford and Portland, ON: Hart, 2006), 237.
80 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/Res/1325)on Women, Peace and Security, adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, 31 October 2000.S/Res/1325 (2000). [hereinafter UN Resolution 1325].
81 The Preamble also expresses concern for refugees and internally displaced persons, as they are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements. See: S.C. Resolution 1325, Preamble.
82 Ibid at paras. 1-5.
83 Resolution 1325 has been described as a ‘thematic’ resolution best understood as a Chapter VI UN Charter non-binding resolution. Its legal authority was enhanced by the fact that it was passed unanimously, and that the resolution uses the language of obligation. For the status and nature of the Resolution, see: C. Bell & C. O’Rourke, ‘Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements’, 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (October 2010), 941 at 943. For the interplay between UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and CEDAW, see ‘Women, Peace and Security: CEDAW and Security Council Resolution 1325: A Quick Guide.’ Available at: http://www.unrol.org/files/CEDAWandUNSCR1325_eng.pdf. (Last accessed in June, 2011).
84 SC Res 1325, at paras. 9, 10, 11 and 12.
85 Ibid 943.
86 SC Res. 1325, at para. 17.
87 Bell & O’Rourke (2010), 946.
88 Figures provided by the authors show that before the adoption of Resolution 1325, 68% percent of a total of 399 peace agreements of a total of 585 peace agreements entered into between 1 January 1990 and 1 May 2010 were signed, while after the Resolution, 32% or 186 agreements were signed. Ibid at 955, 956.
89 Bell & O’Rourke (20100), 945.
90 They make this determination by deploying a quantitative analysis of the number counts of specific references made to women in peace agreements. This helps them assess whether the ‘gender perspective’ mandated by the Resolution has been adopted. Ibid at 945, 946.
91 As the authors make explicit, this figure includes all references to women, including those which limited rather than furthered equality, and those with only small provisions. Ibid at 955.
92 Thus, when agreements mentioning women were disaggregated with reference to the timing of the Resolution 1325, 42 agreements mentioning women were reached before Resolution 1325 was passed constituting 11 percent of all agreements signed before 1325, while 50 agreements mentioning women were reached after Resolution 1325 was passed, constituting 27 percent of all agreements signed after Resolution 1325. The results thus indicate a significant increase in references to women in peace agreements after Resolution 1325 was passed. Ibid at 956.
93 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) (15.Sept, 1995) at: Section E: Women and Armed Conflict Diagnosis.
94 Prominent US feminist Catherine MacKinnon has in many ways been at the forefront of this universalising tendency acting as the spokeswoman for women victims of war, claiming to have special knowledge of how war impacts women due to her standpoint as a woman, albeit a privileged Western woman with no first –hand experience of armed conflict. For some of Mac Kinnon’s most polemic reflections on the Yugoslav War, see: Catherine Mac Kinnon, ‘Rape, Genocide and Women’s Human Rights’, in A. Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln, NA: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), at 183.
95 Ibid at 6 and 7.
96 C. Jones, ‘Indian Victim of Gang Rape dies in Hospital in Singapore’, (The Guardian, Friday, December 28th, 2012). Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/28/indian-gang-rape-dies-singapore (last accessed in December, 2012).