Daniel Heimler^* I. INTRODUCTION
‘[…] we will not enjoy development without security, or security without development. But I also stress that we will not enjoy either without universal respect for human rights’, Kofi A. Annan¹ .

Human Rights issues reach world populations on a daily basis² and this publicity is hardly a surprise because these rights are vitally important for human security and development as the quote above by Annan stresses. They are discussed in the international conferences, the highest levels of governments, and in the class rooms of primary school students. However, the philosophical basis for Human Rights is often misunderstood³ , if considered at all. It is essential that the philosophical foundations of Human Rights are understood in order to properly identify a hierarchy of Human Rights, increase respect for Human Rights, and assist in the solving of complex Human Rights related dilemmas. This paper will critically evaluate dignity-based conceptions of Human Rights, suggest which theories lay the strongest foundations, and argue that the foundations of Human Rights should be seen holistically as a combination of the strongest theories rather than a single theory.

  The horrors of the Second World War led to the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, and the organisation’s founding Charter refers to the importance of ‘reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental Human Rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’⁴ . This ambition was reinforced in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)⁵ and the two 1966 Covenants emanating from the UDHR⁶ . In the name of both ‘dignity’ and ‘Human Rights’ states have been prepared (perhaps ironically) to use military force, as recently seen in Libya⁷ . Notwithstanding the existence of the UN, many situations have contributed to ‘the twentieth century [being] the bloodiest in human existence’⁸ , and a general reference to the Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies⁹ will support this in disturbing detail. Nevertheless, as Perry notes, ‘the emergence of the morality of Human Rights [and the association of these rights with ‘dignity’] makes the moral landscape of the twentieth century a touch less bleak’¹⁰ .

‘The termhuman rights is relatively new’¹¹ (generally being associated with the UN) however philosophers have theorised about ‘dignity’ for millennia¹² . The Human Rights presented in the UDHR appear to be a product of Liberalism and the Liberal conception of human dignity will be critically assessed first. Discussion will then turn to the analysis of other dignity-based philosophical ideas which have influenced Human Rights, including forms of Deontology, Consequentialism and Contractarianism. This article will demonstrate that the Human Rights listed in international legal instruments do not necessarily reflect the strongest dignity-based philosophy that lays the foundations for Human Rights. In some instances there is a justifiable basis for differences between theory and practice, while in other cases the practice should reflect the theory. Searle has argued that the necessary work is just beginning for a clear theory of Human Rights¹³ , however with respect such comments are misleading. It is more appropriate, as Griffin has argued, that philosophers should try to develop the ‘project that the Enlightenment started but left so unfinished’¹⁴ . It is hoped that this work will contribute to such developmentin two main ways. Firstly by illustrating that particular philosophical theories are considerably more appropriate as the philosophical foundations of Human Rights than other theories. Secondly, the more appropriate theories can be shown to be compatible, providing the basis for a holistic conception of human dignity. This holistic theory could be built on with the inclusion of aspects of other theories which have not been explored in this paper due to its limited scope.

A thorough understanding of the philosophical foundations of Human Rights is more important than ever before due to the fact the current era is one where Human Rights principles may be tested in practice to the limit. A key challenge for governments is to ‘effectively respond to the threat of terrorism without abandoning […] fundamental human rights principles’¹⁵ . Unfortunately, a ‘ticking bomb’ scenario is now frighteningly more realistic than the abstract thought experiment it once was. Similarly the degree of freedom of expression people have in a society is evidently topical in the modern world; the issues associated with WikiLeaks and the Leveson Inquiry eachtestify as examples. It is hoped that this paper contributes to decoding the philosophical enigma of Human Rights and helps to indicate a philosophical framework within which these topical issues can be addressed.

II. THE CONCEPT OF ‘DIGNITY’
UN documents¹⁶ claim that the underlying basis for Human Rights is ‘dignity’¹⁷ . Those who question the definition of ‘dignity’ may experience some discomfort regarding what are conceived to be ‘Human Rights’. The Oxford English Dictionary defines‘dignity’ as ‘the quality of being worthy or honourable’¹⁸ . However, as noted by De Baets, the definition is likelyto vary depending on one’s cultural viewpoint¹⁹ . Schachter suggests that the intrinsic meaning of dignity ‘has been left to intuitive understanding, conditioned in large measure by cultural factors’²⁰ . This is insightful to the extent that people will recognise grave indignities such as genocidal massacres or mass killings, but intuition alone does not appear to be a stable basis for a theory ofHuman Rights considering the pluralism of ideas in the world. Nevertheless, acts such as the aforementioned will be recognised by most (if not all) people as indignities. This suggests that there is scope for agreement between cultures on certain matters concerning human dignity. It is due to this basic appreciation that certain activities by their nature and consequences undermine human dignity that both De Baets and Schachter do not consider cultural relativism to be an absolute bar on a consensus on particular issues pertaining to human dignity.

III. THE CONCEPT OF ‘HUMAN RIGHTS’
It seems to be partly due to‘a basic, human emotional empathy with the very concept of suffering’²¹ that that the idea of a fundamental rights regime applying specifically to human beings²² was born. It is also due to the desire to safeguard inherent human dignity which had been so badly undermined during the twentieth century that Human Rights laws were made.

Hohfeld claimed that rights have four clear characteristics: a claim to a right, privileges enabled by the right, powers to require others to comply with the right (they have a ‘duty’ to comply), and immunities from actions which the right permits²³ . The two ‘main theories’of rights are the ‘Will Theory’ and the ‘Interest Theory’²⁴ . As Hart indicates, the former considers the rights holder a ‘small scale sovereign’ having the choice of whether other people’s duties are acted upon²⁵ . The latter in contrast suggests that rights protect X’s ‘well-being [… if] there is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty’²⁶ . Dworkin claimed that rights are ‘political trumps’ which protect individuals against competing community goals²⁷ . Ensuring that individuals are granted such protection is taking rights seriously according to Dworkin. Natural Rights theorists such as Hobbes and Locke claimed that some rights were derived from the metaphysical order of the world and ultimately from God²⁸ . Positivists, notably Bentham, have disagreed claiming that such rights were ‘nonsense upon stilts’ and the only rights capable of existence were rights which had been introduced into the law through human legislation²⁹ .

Human Rights have been declared as being ‘universal’³⁰ , ’equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’³¹ which ‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’³² . Consequently, Human Rights are not all the rights which humans have, but are the most important rights that humans have which safeguard and promote dignity. Hathaway suggested a hierarchy of Human Rights³³ , some of which appear to be the ‘highest aspirations’³⁴ rather than strict Human Rights, words used in the Declaration itself³⁵ . As a result of Human Rights being based on human dignity, it seems to be fair to say that the particular importance of a Human Right will be based on the degree to which it protects or promotes human dignity. Different theories concerning human dignity can lead to different conclusions as to the relative importance of the same Human Right. It is therefore important to consider which dignity-based theories are the strongest in order to have the most holistic understanding of Human Rights.

IV. THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
  Liberalism is a political theory which suggests that the best conditions for people to live in are those where there is as much freedom as possible³⁷ . Dworkin stated that individuals should have equal concern and respect for each other³⁶ . The only justification for interfering with a person’s freedom is to ‘prevent harm to others’ according to Mill³⁸ . Harm in this context relates to more than moral disapproval of a practice and rather the restriction/invasion of another person’s freedom in a way that results in individuals not being treated equally. The UDHR seems to be engraved with the hallmarks of Liberalism, as the Human Rights included are the foundation of ‘freedom’ and that ‘all human beings are born free and equal’³⁹ .

Liberalism has a variety of strengths as a basis for a theory on Human Rights, and sometimes appears to be subject to unjust criticism. Berger suggests that without a clear cultural context which promotes certain conceptions of the good an ‘individual is thrown back upon himself’ in developing their own meaning towards life⁴⁰ . However, Liberalism allows individuals to assess a variety of practices in their community (even if they initially disapprove of them) and make up their own mind as to which they wish to adopt. The only practices which are banned are those which cause significant harm to others. Both Griffin⁴¹ and Kymlicka⁴² agree that Liberalism provides the scope for people to question, re-examine and revise beliefs which they reasonably claim is typically human behaviour. Clearly the community is significant for the development of the individual in Liberal theory despite Ramsay’s argument that Liberalism insists on the ‘asocial, atomistic, solitary and self-sufficient individual’⁴³ . As Kymlicka notes, Liberalism is often misconstrued and does not ignore the importance of the community that an individual lives in⁴⁴ . In the context of international community, nations desire a‘moral lingua franca’to avoid atrocities like those in recent history⁴⁵ . Kyi agrees ‘it is precisely because of the cultural diversity of the world that is necessary for common values to be agreed on to act as a unifying factor⁴⁶ . Notably, Liberalism is not neutral in the sense it endorsesboth freedom and toleration as values. Sandel suggests that Liberalism should consequently not be ‘defended by the claim that no values can be defended’⁴⁷ . However, it seems that an approach which accepts all other approaches,save those which are in violation of the harm principle, is perhaps the only approach that is workable on a global stage and thus can be defended.

  Liberalism does have weaknesses. Firstly, the promotion of Liberalism can lead to social unrest in a state, and interstate tensions on the international level. This is because Liberalism is the promotion of a particular way of life. It is indeed attractive for the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph, however it can and often does conflict with traditions and ways of life which have existed for centuries in certain settings⁴⁸ . Consequently Liberals should be cautious in practice as to how a global morality is promoted; it cannot be rushed. It is important for Liberals to note that ‘not all decent societies are Liberal’ and many Human Rights are de jure/facto safeguarded in a many non-liberal states⁴⁹ . Thus the lack of Liberalism in a state should not necessarily be seen as threatening to the establishment of a Human Rights system.

  A further problem is that the Liberal conception of Human Rights is in fact a predominantly Western conception of Human Rights⁵⁰ . As Jahn⁵¹ and Beitz⁵² note the contribution of the views of Eastern states on ‘human dignity’ have been neglected vis-à-vis the development of Human Rights instruments. Considering Liberals are prepared to wage wars and kill in the name of their values this situation is alarming. Most wars fought in the name of Human Rights relate to undisputed violations of human dignity, for example crimes against humanity. However, it seems that in practice the Liberal conception of Human Rights does not match the theory in that it does not account for the views of every culture or even most cultures. The input from Eastern peoples will strengthen the true Liberal approach to recognising fundamental interests. As globalisation increases it is hoped that the conception of Human Rights develops and, in turn, Human Rights acquire greater respect globally.

V. A DEONTOLOGICAL BASIS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
  Deontology⁵³ is a moral philosophy which is based significantly on the works of Kant. According to Kant human beings are rational and reasonable, thus having autonomy deserving of intrinsic worth⁵⁴ . This worth requires respect which should manifest itself in preventing people from being used as a means to an end⁵⁵ . The influence of this theory on Human Rights can clearly be seen in Human Rights instruments which stress on the ‘inherent dignity’ of human beings. The fact that torture (which has been considered to be a severer attack on the core of human dignity and integrity than the killing of a person⁵⁶ ), is prohibited in all circumstances in international instruments⁵⁷ and the prohibition is considered jus cogens⁵⁸ evidently complies with this branch of philosophy⁵⁹ . Kant firmly stressed the existence of ‘categorical imperative[s]’; ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means’⁶⁰ .

  There are various strengths to Kantian Deontology as a dignity-based conception of Human Rights. Firstly a number of clear categorical rights could be established to prevent a person from being used as a means to an end. Concern for the community in which individuals live is vital for a desirable theory of Human Rights; however Kant argues that people should never be used as a means to an end and that no negotiation can be made on this matter. Considering Human Rights are the most important rights to humankind, it is needless to say that such rights should be as certain as possible. The categorical imperative clearly establishes that even the greatest community interests cannot lead to a person being used as a means to an end⁶¹ . Kant did recognise that there were other ways to promote human dignity which were not categorical imperatives. These are described as ‘imperfect duties’ and involve individuals choosing to go out of their way to make the world a better place by showing benevolence even on a small scale⁶² . The reason these duties are not categorical is because an individual ‘would deprive himself’; not being able to exercise their autonomy as they would be obliged to help others⁶³ . Thus while such behaviours should encouraged, or be attractive ‘aspirations’, they would not be fundamentally necessary to safeguard human dignity.

While the categorical imperative principle would lead to certain laws, claiming all categorical wrongs are of the same value appears to run counter to the intuitive idea that some wrongs are worse than others. To illustrate this point consider the following moral dilemma. A German home owner living during the Third Reich is hiding a Jewish family person in their property when members of the Gestapo knock at the door and ask if the home owner has seen any Jews. The home owner knows that if s/he tells the truth the Jews will almost certainly die but if they lie they would be violating one of Kant’s categorical imperatives. Kant claimed that‘a collision of duties and obligations is entirely inconceivable’⁶⁴ . It may be that distinctions between, inter alia, intending/foreseeing, foreseeing/risking and doing/allowing⁶⁵ would lead a person to avoid a conflict between categorical imperatives and conclude in the given example that to lie would be worse. However, commentators including Moore suggest conflicts can occur⁶⁶ . Many people are likely to feel that allowing someone to die (even if they are not personally killing the individual) is worse than being directly responsible for a lie which could save a life⁶⁷ .

  The notion of a categorical Human Right appears to be weak in light of the significance of the community. As Griffin notes ‘issues about trade-offs [between different rights and between rights and the common good] should be at the heart of an account of Human Rights’⁶⁸ . This is because the individual should not be seen in complete isolation; the community is important in its own right and, as suggested above, allows for individuals to develop. To provide for trade-offs means that nothing can be categorical. As Moore convincingly argues⁶⁹ and Griffin appears to agree⁷⁰ , if the situation arose where by the lives of a vast number of people could be saved by torturing an innocent person then there would be a point at which the torture should arguably be carried out as a lesser evil. The German Constitutional Court has declared section 14(3) of Aviation Security Act 2005 unconstitutional which provided for planes to be shot down in a September 11^thtype scenario⁷¹ . Whether such a decision would have been made were the stakes higher is debatable. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Israel recognised, obiter, that in instances where torture is used to prevent extreme atrocities such as in a ‘ticking bomb’ scenario, the defence of necessity may be available to those conducting the torture⁷² . It is true that the reliability of data or information obtained by torture is questionable and therefore the particular circumstances in which torture may be justified would need to be especially carefully considered⁷³ . It is however argued that there is a point (which would need to be established on a case by case basis, after considering all the circumstances) that the good for the wider community as a whole should prevail. Section VI considers a type of Deontology which takes a greater account of the need for trade-offs.

VI. THRESHOLD DEONTOLOGY AS A STRONGER FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS THAN ABSOLUTISM
‘Threshold Deontology’ (TD) appears to be a more holistic deontological theory. Moore, the main advocate for TD, stressed that principles (for example the protection of human dignity) have a value and while this value may be large it is not insurmountable vis-à-vis the avoidance of certain consequences. There are two conceptions of TD. The first refers to a threshold of awfulness after which categorical imperatives do not apply⁷⁴ . The second refers to a sliding scale where the threshold varies in proportion to the wrong being done⁷⁵ . The second conception appears to be a stronger theoretical basis for Human Rights on the basis it shows a balanced respect for human dignity as well as the pressing need to protect the community. Such a conception would address key weaknesses of deontological absolutism and embrace the issue of trade-offs. Commentators advocating both Eastern and Western views agree that the relationship between the individual and society is an issue which is fundamental when considering a basis for Human Rights⁷⁶ . The theory provides a way of dealing with the most desperate- sauve-qui-peut (“every man for himself”)situations. Both Williams⁷⁷ and Griffin⁷⁸ argued that such situations are so drastic that any decision in relation to them does not matter from a moral point of view. However, TD would suggest that morality can address the situation by advocating for the lesser evil. Importantly, such advocacy should occur with a ‘whisper’ as the lesser evil is nevertheless an evil⁷⁹ .

  The main problem regarding TD is the identification of a particular threshold. Commentators such as Ellis⁸⁰ and Alexander⁸¹ have stressed that there would be no clear way of discerning a threshold. Even Moore himself has pointed out that each case would have to be assessed on its own facts and a decision made⁸² . Considering the idea that human dignity is something that every human being possesses, such a crude subjective approach is unattractive. However, as Fields argues, a conception of Human Rights is required to be holistic as there are an infinite number of ways that a person’s dignity can be safeguarded, promoted and interfered with⁸³ . Sometimes the most holistic approach is to assess each case on its own facts. Decisions may vary between those potentially making these very difficult decisions in practice but this (subject to regulation) may be the best that human beings can do in these hard cases. TD does appear to be an appropriate theory for addressing topics such as torture which was mentioned in Section V of this paper. The question may therefore be posed whether torture should remain absolutely prohibited by international Human Rights instruments?. Despite there being a significant philosophical basis which could justify torture in very limited circumstances⁸⁴ , the existence of any legal scope for the authorisation of torture could open a ‘Pandora’s box’⁸⁵ with torture being used more frequently than if TD was properly applied. Therefore, it is suggested that the law should continue to absolutely prohibit torture,to prevent an abuse of TD. The fact TD does provide the scope for torture in the most limited circumstances does however allow those making the most difficult Human Rights decisions to act in a way which gives proper respect to human dignity provided the threshold is very carefully calculated.

VII. ACT UTILITARIANISM AS THE UNDERPINNING OF A HUMAN RIGHTS THEORY
Act Utilitarianism is one of the most famous examples of a broader philosophy known as Consequentialism. Consequentialist schools of thought suggest that a dignified human life is one which shows significant (and often absolute) concern for the consequences of behaviour based on a conception of the good⁸⁶ .

  Bentham is a well-known advocate of Act Utilitarianism Hedonism which suggests that happiness is the only intrinsic good which human beings seek⁸⁷ . Happiness is the experience of pleasure over pain⁸⁸ . From the onset it is important to note that Bentham suggested rights should be established if they produced the greatest happiness for the greatest number⁸⁹ . This clearly conflicts with Dworkin’s notion of rights as ‘trumps’ as well as deontological theories on the basis that rights in the context of these theories are characterised by their protection of individuals from threats posed by community goals.

  Nevertheless this form of Utilitarianism has a significant degree of appropriateness as a dignity-based conception for Human Rights. Firstly, like deontological absolutism it is a relatively simple theory in its premise; all that is required is the greatest happiness is calculated. Killing innocent people does not generally make the majority happy and thus rights should safeguard these interests. Utilitarianism also offers a clear answer to the hard cases being discussed above; if even one additional life could be saved by torturing or killing a person or number of people then this is the action which should be taken. Further, Act Utilitarian Hedonism recognises individuals make up the community and,in promoting the overall happiness, it takes account of every individuals’ conception of happiness regardless of what that is and weighs it respectively. Under this theory, rights which require the active promotion of the welfare of individuals are likely to be established or even insisted on.

  The theory may be simple, however like deontological absolutism it appears reductionist. Happiness is not the only thing which people seek. Raghunathan points out, for example, many people appear to prefer to know the truth than be happy⁹⁰ . This is illustrated by ‘The Sheriff’ thought experiment which presents the situation of a mob demanding a (innocent) prisoner be hanged for a killing they think he committed and the Utilitarian response providing the scope for the innocent person to be hanged if it will save net lives by preventing a riot⁹¹ . This is because happiness is more important than the truth in the Utilitarian theory. In light of this it can be suggested that Utilitarianswould also suppress the truth in order to sustain the general happiness of the majority. It may be argued by Utilitarians that if promoting certain values (such as the truth) makes people happy then the value would not be deprived from them. However, this appears to be an ‘empirical dodge’ in that the future cannot be accurately predicted in respect of whether the truth of a situation would ever be discovered by those who want to act (unknowingly) on a false premise at a particular time and what degree of happiness the same people would experience by knowing the truth⁹² . Act Utilitarian Hedonists would make decisions based on the facts available to them at a particular time. Given the facts of the ‘Sheriff thought experiment’ Utilitarians would hang the innocent person⁹³ . The Utilitarian response is to ‘outsmart’, meaning ‘to embrace the conclusion of one’s opponent’s reductio ad absurdum argument’⁹⁴ however this is hardly a satisfactory result. As both Rawls⁹⁵ and Shestack⁹⁶ have commented, Utilitarianism fails to recognise significantly the distinction between persons. Each person is potentially expendable for the happiness of a greater number of people. In order to promote happiness Utilitarians would be prepared to develop an oppressive regime, with rights being worth very little. This is hardly compatible with intuitions relating to the promotion of human dignity.

These points aside, it appears that it may not be the quantity of happiness which attracts people but its intensity, this is illustrated in the thought experiment ‘Haydn and the Oyster’⁹⁷ . A soul in heaven is given the choice between two lives, that of the composer Joseph Haydn and that of an oyster. Besides composing wonderful music and influence the evolution of symphony, Haydn will enjoy success in his lifetime, he will be cheerful, popular and gain enjoyment from the practical activities he engages in. The oyster’s life will consist only of mild sensual pleasure although it will enjoy each bask in the water the same as the first time. Haydn will live until the age of seventy-seven while the oyster can live as long as the soul desires. Clearly, Haydn’s life will involve more intense pleasures but, if the oyster’s life is long enough, its overall pleasure (from a Benthamite perspective) will outweigh that of Haydn. Many people would prefer Haydn’s life based on its quality⁹⁸ . In any event, it is very difficult and time consuming to calculate what produces the greatest happiness. Crisp notes that Mill appears to understate the demanding nature of Utilitarianism on purpose so as to avoid losing support⁹⁹ .

VIII. RULE UTILITARIANISM: A MORE APPROPRIATE UTILITARIAN THEORY?
Rule Utilitarianism is often presented as an attractive alternative to Act Utilitarianism, including its strengths but lacking its weaknesses. Barnes highlights that Rule Consequentialism is a moral school of thought which requires a set of rules be created on the basis of a conception of the good (for example happiness for rule Utilitarians)¹⁰⁰ . The rule should promote the good in as many situations as possible, although occasionally a situation may arise where the rule does not. This approach can be seen in some respect as an attempt to avoid the issue of an empirical dodge. Indeed as Moore argues¹⁰¹ , a rule may be ‘never torture an innocent’ as this action will generally not increase people’s happiness; especially if they are aware of the truth. As a basis for Human Rights this approach may seem attractive as it is likely to avoid the intuitively abhorrent consequences Act Utilitarianism may produce. It also seems to provide a strong foundation for rights, based on rules which cannot be changed as easily as a change of mind as to what makes people happy.

However, the calculations required to develop such a rule would or should be significantly advanced. To develop a theory of Human Rights would be very time consuming even if not as much as Act Utilitarianism. Further, if actions are morally right providing they follow a rule then in some instances, as Moore points out, there would be significant inconsistency with the underlying consequentialist demand in that the best consequences may not be produced by following a rule¹⁰² . This could be due to miscalculations in making the rule and the difficulty inconsidering every possible scenario. Due to the uncertainty of the stability of a rule, such an approach to Human Rights would likely conflict with the principle of certainty. Threshold deontology in contrast does provide a more consistent approach, viz. that a threshold must be met before certain action can be taken.

IX. A CONTRACTARIAN BASIS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?
When living in a society the extent of a person’s freedom will be limited more than if they were in a state of nature; where an individual would be morally at liberty to punish someone who has wronged him/her¹⁰³ . It is the famous notion of a social contract which justifies a limit on liberty under this theory. As Cummiskey notes, Contractualist theories link respect for the dignity of persons with some form of consent condition being met¹⁰⁴ . This is because seeking consent respects autonomy. However, a number of issues arise as to what constitutes consent.

  A Voluntaristic conception of consent requires every person in a society to consent to being subject to the government of that society¹⁰⁵ . This would show significant respect for an individual’s autonomy although an individual would be brought up in the context of a society until the point they could rationally provide consent, and by this point they would have already been influenced by the society they live in. It does not appear theoretically possible or practical to seek actual consent. Even if an individual decided against being the subject of a society, the harm principle would engage society in preventing that individual from causing harm to the rest of society. Consequently, it appears that a literal conception of consent is not realistic as Rawls notes¹⁰⁶ .

An alternative to the Voluntarist approach to consent is the Hypothetical approach¹⁰⁷ . Rawls argued that a scheme which promotes the freedom and equality of individuals was as close as a society could come to a voluntary consent scheme¹⁰⁸ . It would appear that a Liberal political climate which protects common concerns of human beings would be legitimate in regard to its respect for autonomy. Thus Human Rights based on human dignity vis-à-vis autonomy can be the standard against which governments are critically assessed. The problem is deciding what ‘common concerns’ to humanity are. The Liberal approach appears to be the best approach to adopt in order to promote tolerance in a diverse world. However, ‘conceptions of human dignity vary drastically across societies’¹⁰⁹ . Even those which accept an autonomy based notion of human dignity may have different views on what should be permitted in a particular society. Nevertheless the final Section of this paper will argue that these problems can be resolved.

X. A HOLISTIC CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BASED ON DIGNITY CAN BE IDENTIFIED
  It would seem that a relatively holistic conception of Human Rights can be developed based on human dignity. This holistic conception of Human Rights involves considering Human Rights in the context of the strongest philosophical foundations which have been outlined. From the onset it appears that there are a number of common concerns that would be of an interest to all people regardless of the society they are from. Beitz recognises that particular interests are culturally neutral and would include the protection of life from killings or torture on an unfounded basis¹¹⁰ . The rights which protect these interests (‘basic rights’¹¹¹ ) have a very high value not because of an agreement between people but rather that these rights protect people from wrongs which, by their nature and consequences, are abhorrent to human beings¹¹² . It has already been suggested in this paper that arguably no Human Right should be absolute but rather serve as a prima facie protection against abuse. The greater the importance of a right, the greater the justification required to depart from protecting the interest the right protects. This approach gives significant weight to an individual’s dignity without disregarding competing community interests. This approach gives significant weight to an individual’s dignity without disregarding competing community interests. These basic rights are Civil and Political (CP)rights. It has been argued by Ramsay that Economic, Social and Cultural (ESC) rights come from the same moral base as Civil and Political (CP) rights and can be properly regarded as Human Rights¹¹³ . While both ESC rights and CP rights significantly promote human dignity, Ramsay’s comment appears slightly misleading as a philosophical distinction can be made between the moral bases for (1) the basic CP rights and (2) the remaining CP rights and ESC rights. The duties relating to the basic CP rights do not necessarily (from a Kantian perspective)require action, as abstinence from action harmful to other people can potentially satisfy the duty¹¹⁴ . In contrast the duties relating to ESC rights (and admittedly some CP rights) necessarily require action in order for the duty to be satisfied¹¹⁵ . Positive obligations in respect of rights are desirable because they improve people’s lives and consequently should be encouraged, even the basic CP interests can be more broadly protected¹¹⁶ with ‘imperfect duties’¹¹⁷ . Despite this, duties which do not require active intervention into the lives of other people show the greatest respect for autonomy.

  Unlike an interest not to be subject to torture, non-basic CP rights such asfreedom of expression will vary in their manifestation, depending on the part of the world an individual is from. What is the value of this category of rights? Freedom of expression does contribute to human developmentand in light of an increasingly globalised society it is in the interests of humanity as a whole for individuals to be aware of a variety of views/experiences¹¹⁸ . Griffin highlights that different cultures may require slight variations of the extent of freedom to expression, in order to safeguard the moral fibres of the society¹¹⁹ . Consequently, practicalities necessitate regional variations in non-basic CP interests¹²⁰ . As Jahn¹²¹ and Beitz¹²² argue these interests could be exposed through greater talks with Eastern representatives and ultimately incorporate their views in a conception of Human Rights. The increased incorporation of Eastern views will mean that Liberal theory is being deployed in practice to a greater extent than currently is the case.

XI. CONCLUSION
  In conclusion, some dignity-based theories of Human Rights appear significantly stronger than others, and even some of these strong theories can be improved further in practice. Human Rights seem to have been born out of conceptions of human dignity and have emerged from the display of humankind’s horrific ability for self-destruction throughout the twentieth century. As Perry noted there was a need for a ‘moral lingua franca’ to prevent a recurrence of earlier atrocities¹²³ . It was suggested that Utilitarianism does not provide a strong philosophical basis for Human Rights because it fails to provide significantly safeguard rights and also fails to respect the inherent dignity of persons. In contrast, it was argued that Liberalism, Threshold Deontology and the Contractarian Hypothetical approach to consent provided the strongest basis for a theory of Human Rights. However, there is a need to incorporate the views of Eastern peoples when considering the permissibility of cultural variations. It is the combination of these theories which provide a holistic way of understanding Human Rights. The key features of the holistic philosophical basis of Human Rights are: human beings have inherent dignity and worth based significantly on their rationality and autonomy; human beings should show equal concern and respect for each other; community interests should be balanced against individual interests;it is only after a threshold value of an individual interest has been passed that a competing community goal can triumph over it; the more important the interest is in protecting human dignity the higher the threshold will be;whether a threshold has been surmounted by a competing community goal will be assessed on an individual basis taking into account all the circumstances; the exposure of individuals to a variety of ways of life provides the best conditions for people to develop and choose how they live their own lives; a government’s respect for human dignity is vital in order to obtain legitimacy; there are a variety of basic human interests which exist irrespective of culture; rights which impose positive obligations on a duty bearer risk violating the duty bearer’s autonomy; positive obligations in respect of rights are desirable should be encouraged. A holistic understanding of the philosophical foundations of Human Rights is vital because it can be used to properly identify a hierarchy of Human Rights and framework to assist in the solving of complex Human Rights related dilemmas.

  A proper appreciation of the philosophical foundations of the most important rights would hopefully lead to near universal acceptance of these rights. The appalling on-going humanitarian situation in Syria has failed to be addressed partly due to a lack of international unity on the issue¹²⁴ . This is despite the fact that human dignity is being starkly undermined in the region¹²⁵ . The situation is indeed politically delicate however a holistic understanding of the philosophical foundations of Human Rights could potentially assist in tackling the problem in Syria (and similar situations) by facilitating the development of a united international conscience to a greater extent than any which currently exists (if one exists at all¹²⁶ ). In the context of the important but non-basic right of freedom of expression, the appreciation that various groups of people express themselves in particular ways because they consider that expression to be part of their identity means that non-harmful forms of expression which are not common in a society should be more readily accepted in that society. Further, the fact that Liberalism itself prospers when a larger rather than smaller variety of views are expressed would also endorse a policy of acceptance rather than rejection. It is true that for interests relating to rights to be widely safeguarded, positive obligations on various duty holders are required. The threat to autonomy posed by positive obligations has been discussed in this paper. However, a holistic understanding of human dignity is likely to encourage people to exercise their autonomy and take up such positive obligations. It seems fitting to conclude this paper with the following poem by Pastor Martin Niemoller:

‘First they came for the Communists
And I did not speak out
Because I was not a Communist
Then they came for the Socialists
And I did not speak out
Because I was not a Socialist
Then they came for the trade unionists
And I did not speak out
Because I was not a trade unionist
Then they came for the Jews
And I did not speak out
Because I was not a Jew
Then they came for me
And there was no one left
To speak out for me’¹²⁷